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This paper has a twofold aim. First, we will analyze the system of family benefits in relation 
with the income tax system in France through the adoption of a historical and gender 
perspective. While typologies of welfare states frequently neglect taxation, in our view, one 
must take family taxation into account because it provides incentives and disincentives for 
paid income. Moreover, in the case of France, a close relationship exists between family 
benefits and taxation on income, one that stems from certain discussions—discussions led to 
the birth of the French system.Second, we will demonstrate how and to what extent France 
has moved away from the male-breadwinner model. However, any decline of the male-
breadwinner model does not, in turn, indicate a corresponding shift toward a dual caregiver 
model. Indeed, the current French model has ambiguous effects on gender relations.  
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  In contrast to both the United Kingdom—which long considered the family to fall 
essentially within the private domain
1—and to Germany
2
  In 2008, French family-children benefits accounted for 8.4 percent of the nation’s total 
social benefits and 2.5percent of GDP; in contrast, the average for the EU-27 was 8.3 percent 
of total benefits and 2.1percent of GDP (Antonella Puglia 2011; see also Appendix and Table 
1). Although these statistics enable international comparisons, they do not take into account 
tax benefits or credits, nor do they consider some benefits modulated according to the family 
—where a strong emphasis is put on 
the principle of subsidiarity, France has an explicit family policy wherein it conceptualizes the 
family as an institution requiring state support.  
                                                 
1 Since 1997, the Labour Government has placed balancing work and family life high on the agenda (see Jane 
Lewis and Mary Campbell 2007).  
2 However, Germany has undertaken recent reforms in family policy aimed at promoting social investment via 
early childhood education and supporting parents to balance work and family responsibilities, thereby also 
tackling the fertility issue.   2 
composition. Last, the French welfare-state effort with respect to children and families 
amounts to between 3 to 5 percent of GDP.  
  In the comparative literature on welfare states as relates to regime typology, France 
holds a paradoxical place. Applying G∅sta Esping Andersen’s typology classifies France into 
the conservative-corporatist regime. However, when adopting a gender perspective, France 
diverges from the conservative-corporatist regime. Marcia K. Meyers, Janet C. Gornik and 
Katherin E. Ross (1999) have cited childcare provisions and parental-leave schemes as both 
variations of and defining properties of welfare states. Their research has focused on the 
extent to which the state can help mothers of young children combine paid work and 
motherhood. This clusters France with Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Italy. Linda 
Hantrais and Marie-Thérèse Letablier (1996) outline several models of work-family 
reconciliation in Europe via their analysis of the package of maternity and parental leave, 
work-time  arrangements, and childcare provisions in relation to the patterns of female 
employment. France belongs to the group of countries that includes Belgium and the Nordic 
states—these share the characteristic of “a juxtaposition of family and employment with state 
support,” although their policy logics differ.
3 Jonathan Bradshaw and Naomi Finch’s study 
(2002) of the child-benefit package in 22 countries indicates that France is on the fourth place 
in the league table.
4
                                                 
3 Two other models of work-life balance are distinguished: a model alternating work and family incentives 
(Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and a non-interventionist model (The United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain).  
4 The overall ranking is based on the average child benefit package (cash benefits, tax relief or service in kind 
which support families with children) paid to a « representative » sample of families. The situation described is 
at July 2001.   
 In particular, France’s child support package aims to relieve child 
poverty. Barbara B. Bergmann (1997) compares programs for families with children in France 
with those in the Unites States and explains the differing child-poverty rates by the level and 
the structure of theses programs. Many also consider France a type of halfway-house on the 
continuum between the “woman-friendly” states of Scandinavia and the liberal laissez-faire 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Indeed, France represents a “modified male breadwinner” state in 
Jane Lewis’s typology (1992) not only because French women have gained status and rights 
as wives, mothers, and workers, but also because they have historically been able to combine 
the roles of mothers and workers. French women’s labor-force participation remains relatively 
high although natalist concerns guide family policy in addition to favoring extensive families. 
At the same time, however, public provision of childcare supports women’s employment. A 
well-developed public preschool system covers almost all children between the ages of three 
and six. Susan Pedersen (1993) arrives at a similar conclusion when she contrasts the logics   3 
that underlie the formation of the welfare states of France and the United Kingdom. She 
describes the French welfare state as parental and directed to the horizontal redistribution 
across families—in sharp contrast to the British welfare state, structured around the male 
breadwinner model.  
  Comparative feminist scholarship appears to offer favorable evaluations of the effects 
of French family policy on women. In reality, one can find strongly conflicting interpretations 
of this subject in the literature. According to Jane Jenson and Mariette Sineau (1998), French 
women have obtained formal rights in the labor market, but real equality between women and 
men has made little progress. Concerning Kimberly Morgan (2002), she shows that the place 
of France in the comparative analysis focused on early childhood policies is over-valued 
because of the country’s highly developed public preschool system—attended by almost all 
three-to-six-year-old children. Moreover, France has recently reformed the childcare policy 
intended for children under the age of three in an attempt to introduce more flexible and 
individualized forms of childcare—at the expense of public childcare centers. Thus, market 
forces have come to play a larger part in family arrangements. These reforms have affected 
the development of the domestic services sector, which has become increasingly feminized, 
thereby reinforcing labor market segregation and weakening gender equality.  
  By selecting social care services both for children and elderly people as a gender-
relevant dimension, one can also reconsider the French case within the conservative-
corporatist welfare states. Differing from Germany and the Netherlands, France forms a 
cluster with Belgium and Italy because they each provide high levels of public provisions for 
children and make fewer provisions for dependent adults (Diane Sainsbury 1999: 246).  
  Therefore, although France holds a relatively unusual place  amongst conservative-
corporatist welfare states, feminist and comparative analyses on welfare state regimes present 
researcher with a curious puzzle about the impact of French welfare policies on the situation 
of women and on the structuring of gender relations. The fact that scholars often examine the 
French model in a given period (the period between the wars, the 1980s and 1990s, and so 
forth) may, in part, explain this seeming contradiction in the literature. Moreover, the 
assessment of the extent to which family-friendly policies characterize France could be quite 
different when one takes into account both care for children and for elderly people, in 
particular because France has been historically more concerned with the welfare of children 
than that of the elderly. Indeed, it is only in the early 2000s that France has developed specific 
policies to deal with the increased need for care for dependent elderly people.    4 
  This paper has a twofold aim. First, we will analyze the system of family benefits in 
relation with the income tax system in France through the adoption of a historical and gender 
perspective. While typologies of welfare states frequently neglect taxation, in our view, one 
must take family taxation into account because it provides incentives and disincentives for 
paid income.
5
  Our approach in this study  is  to  analyze  the specific policy content and reform 
trajectories in France because this provides a more complete and coherent view of the French 
welfare state. To assess the extent to which France has evolved toward the dual earner family-
policy model, we draw on Rosemary Crompton’s framework to explore national variations in 
gender relations and division of labor as well as the shift from the male breadwinner model 
toward another model. A continuum reflecting different patterns of male and female paid 
work and arrangements for care represent the “gender regimes” or “gender systems”; it shows 
a range of models from traditional male breadwinner/female caregiver arrangements, to 
current partial modifications (dual earner/female part-time caregiver; dual earner/state 
caregiver or dual earner/marketized caregiver), to an idealized model “dual earner/dual 
caregiver” in which an equal distribution of care work and waged labor between men and 
women becomes possible
 The interaction of the tax system with the benefit system may also encourage 
lower-income women to stay at home. Moreover, in the case of France, a close relationship 
exists  between family benefits and taxation on income, one that  stems  from certain 
discussions—discussions  led  to the birth of the French system.To understand these 
relationships, one must first understand the content of  these debates. Second, we will 
demonstrate how and to what extent France has moved away from the male-breadwinner 
model. However, any decline of the male-breadwinner model does not, in turn, indicate a 
corresponding shift toward a dual caregiver model. Indeed, the current French model has 
ambiguous effects on gender relations. 
6
                                                 
5 The tax issues that are often examined using a gender perspective include the problem of tax evasion (for 
example, see Klarita Gërxhami 2007 ; John Hasseldine and Peggy A. Hite 2003) or are addressed in the debate 
on the individualization of social rights (for example, see Danièle Meulders and Maria Jepsen 2002).  
6Jane Lewis’s continuum (2001) differs slightly from that of Rosemary Crompton. She distinguishes full-time, 
short part-time or long part-time work in the patterns of female employment; in addition, his continuum includes 
single mothers. Single mothers challenge both mainstream and feminist typologies as well as social policies. On 
the one hand, the male breadwinner has been a central part of the framework used to analyze and understand the 
nature of welfareprovisions. On the other hand, in most countries, policy makers swing from treating single 
mothers as mothers to treating them as workers (Lewis, 1997). An awareness of the research interest in single 
mothers in comparative social policy  has begun to grownot only because of their increasing importance in 
quantitative terms in most developed countries, but also because solo mothers provide a litmus test of gendered 
social rights in different welfare state regimes (Barbara Hobson 1994; see also Randy Albelda, Susan 
Himmelweit, and Jane Humphries 2004).  
 
 (Rosemary Crompton 1999). Each of these models is grounded in   5 
a set of assumptions about what the contributions of men and women to households ought to 
look like. Normative expectations about the roles of men and women underpin the 
construction of social policies, which, in turn, influence the choice of women to engage in 
paid work in the labor market or in unpaid caregiving in the home. 
  Rosemary Crompton stresses that, “the point of the exercise is not to provide a matrix, 
or static taxonomy, within which nation states may be precisely located. Rather, the aim is to 
develop a flexible framework through which change may be conceptualized” (1999: 204). 
Although largely theoretical in its conception, this continuum also serves as a useful tool with 
which to analyse the trajectories of welfare states between different types of models. We will 
illustrate this below by showing that French welfare state may be described as having moved 
from a “male breadwinner model/female caregiver” model toward a “dual-earner/state 
caregiver” model, yet one with the market playing an increasing role as a provider of care 
even if families receive subsidies to offset care costs. 
 
1. The roots of the French system of direct and indirect family transfers and the original 
debates 
In the French economic literature devoted to the links between the system of family 
benefits and family-related tax cuts, scholars challenge three theoretical models: 
1) The first model, the “child economic commodity” (or “child as an expense”), relates 
to the freedom all individuals have to use their incomes in respect to their preference scales. 
In other words, one can consider becoming a parent as a consumption choice. Yet, why 
should State authorities help families if the choice of having one child or several children 
stems from diverse “family oriented” individual preferences? Along these lines, Gary 
Becker’s “new economy of the family” suggests that a child should be considered as a good 
the household “consumes” (Gary Becker 1981). 
2) The second model presents the education of children by families as a provision of 
services contributing to all society. In this conception, the system of direct and indirect family 
transfers reflect a pattern of monetary state aids, compensating for the advantages the society 
derives from such households taking care of inactive persons (children). Strict equality must 
rule the transfers’ sharing so that the model can be called “equalitarian”. Family-related tax 
cuts and allowances ought to be directly proportional to the number of children. In other 
words, the state pays the family allowances regardless of the parents’ income, and the 
income-tax calculation depends directly on their net income without taking into account 
family-oriented tax cuts.   6 
3) The parity concept in terms of living standards serves as the basis of the third 
model. The system of direct and indirect family transfers encompasses a twofold combination 
of family aids. First, the income tax must be modulated in order to reflect the taxpayer’s 
ability to pay in a specific manner. The purpose of the income tax is to ensure an equitable 
distribution of income taxation between families that are different in size but identical in 
standards of living (Gérard Calot 1986; Henri Sterdyniak 1992; Réjane Hugounenq and Henri 
Sterdyniak 1999). In other words, this specific interpretation of the income tax reflects a 
conception of horizontal equity defined as “parity between families”. When households face 
identical pre-tax incomes but different family configurations, the income tax function needs to 
preserve the equalityof  post-tax equality in standards of living. The outcome reflects the 
diverging tax burdens, leading to similar “lowering of living standards” (Gérard Calot 1980: 
1212). One can measure the equivalent standard of living of pre-tax income by income per 
consumption unit. 
  Second, the purposes of direct family transfers are twofold. Family allowances 
partially compensate for the expenses of having a child. The other family benefits form part of 
the redistributive system, which unifies some family benefits favoring the least well-off 
families. Last, this third model relates both to the principle of compensation and to the 
principle of the ability to contribute (Ai-Thu Dang and Jean-Marie Monnier 2004). One can 
relate the French system of family transfers to the third theoretical model because of its 
transformation after the Second World War.  
  By the end of the nineteenth century, the defeat of 1870 and the following political 
crisis had given rise to an awareness of France’s shrinking population. Many advocates of a 
public, family-oriented intervention directly connected the decline of the French birth rate 
during that century to the loss of French political influence. 
  On the contrary, some opponents to any public intervention in this field supported the 
old “individualistic conception” that distrusted the “Family”, viewing it as an oppressive 
institution. These advocates took significant inspiration from the French Revolution and the 
equalitarian principles of France’s 1789 Declaration of Human Rights. On this basis, the civil 
code (1804) recognized the right of divorce and set up equalitarian transmission rules for the 
successions. The“interventionists” saw the addition of the civil code’s new legal system and 
of the policy of “laisser-faire” in the Family’s field as responsible for Malthusian behaviourin 
French households. They accused the individualistic conception of helping cause the “moral 
crisis”—the decline of the family’s place in the society and of the social status of being a 
father. Far from representing  a unanimity of opinions, one can further divide the   7 
“interventionist party” into the “family-oriented” and the “natality-oriented” schools of 
thought (Michel Villac 1993). 
  The social principles of Roman Catholic doctrine partially inspired the “family-
oriented” framework, which emphasized the moral and institutional role the Family played 
and pointed out its ethical value. The defenders of the “familialist” agenda focused, for 
example, on large families
7 presented as a political model with, among their principle claims, 
the concept of the “family vote”.
8
  The “natalist” framework focused on increasing the birth rate via efficient means. 
According to the defenders of this agenda, the emergence of financial incentives encouraging 
the families’ fertility became the leading problem. They pointed to the weak purchasing 
power of large families and stressed the awfulness of their living conditions, especially the 
least well-off families
 
  The “familialist” framework held major influence at the beginning of the French 
family benefits system (Henri Hatzfeld 1989). At the end of the nineteenth century, some 
catholic entrepreneurs set up in their factories an “overwage” (sur salaire) system for workers 
who were heads of their families. The famous Pope Leon XIII encyclical, Rerum novarum 
(1891), directly inspired these efforts. This encyclical based its social teaching on two 
connected fields: the importanceof the family  in establishing moralvalues  and the justice 
principles in terms of workers’ income. According to this teaching, a fair wage for the head of 
the family must allow his family a fair life. Without any apparent link to the production level, 
the “overwage” system relied on the number of children in working families. Compensation 
structures ensured its financial and organizational management. The entrepreneurs’ 
representatives managed the system, distributing the benefit and the financial share. It was 
generalised with the laws of both 1932 and 1938–1939, which formalized a “familialist” and 
“natalist” family policy (Alain Barjot 1972). The “natalist” framework, in particular, 
influenced the 1938–1939 reforms of the family code, creating a system of family allowances 
that progressed according to the number of children. 
9
  If the Second World War and the Vichy’s government did not completely interrupt the 
family benefits program, the year 1945 brought a period of renewal. At the end of the war, the 
French analysed the defeat of 1940 in a manner similar to how they analysed the defeat of 
. They suggested that the financial incentives encourage young 
households to have two or three childrenquickly. 
                                                 
7 With six or seven children. 
8 It consisted of giving an additional vote to the head of the family in case of large families. 
9 According to the natalist defenders, a family with three children is the normal familial model.   8 
1870. According to the interventionist camp, the population decline had caused the French 
military and political collapses. The system of family benefits was insufficient in preventing 
this decline because of its weakness, except during a short period of time after the 1938—
1939 reforms. Critics underscored the inadequacy of the tax system. A system of fixed-rate 
rebates was combined with over-taxation of income for the unmarried households, widowed 
households, or the households without children. Last, they pointed out the lack of connection 
between the direct and the indirect family transfers. 
  After the Second World War, the political influence of the “individualist” camp had 
weakened; a large consensus emerged on the question of the family policy (Pierre Laroque 
1985). The resulting compromise between the “familialist” and the “natalist” camps took the 
form of different but related laws that connected the family benefits system and the income 
tax. The “family quotient”, a particular form of a joint system of income taxation
10
  We investigate the combined impact of family taxes and benefits on gender relations 
in France and in the long run. We analyse both policy changes and how the French system has 
moved from the male breadwinner model toward a dual-earner family model. However, 
, remains 
one of the principal results of this compromise; it was considered in 1945 to be the “sixth” 
family allowance (Jean-Yves Nizet 1991). This link between the system of family benefits 
and family-related income-tax cuts still forms the foundation of the French system of direct 
and indirect family transfers.  
  All of these debates have shaped the French system. This legacy explains why family 
policies or policies aimed at reconciling work and family life have balanced between 
“familialism” and “individualism” over the four last decades. Given this, reforms and 
measures in the field of family policy often appear ambiguous and contradictory.  
 
2. The evolution of French welfare regime: From the male breadwinner model toward a 
new model? 
                                                 
10Under the French personal annual progressive tax system, the fiscal unit is not the individual but the household. 
Each household corresponds to a certain number of tax parts depending on civil status and number of children: a 
married couple are entitled to two parts, an additional half-part for the first two children and an additional part 
per child from the third child. Taxable income is divided by the number of parts. The total income tax equals the 
liable tax on one part multiplied by the number of parts. From the redistributive point of view French income tax 
favours higher-income families with children in spite of the use of the family quotient ceiling. There is a 
maximum tax-cut that can be derived from the child part of the family quotient, when comparing with income 
tax systems of different European countries (Anthony Atkinson, François Bourguignon and Pierre-André 
Chiappori 1988, Cathal O'Donoghue and Holly Sutherland 1999). 
   9 
women—even when they have a job—still perform most domestic activities and caring work 
within the household.  
  The  years since 1945break  into three distinct periods, each of which we analyze 
below. 
 
2.1 1945–1975: The French male breadwinner model 
  This stage subdivides into two sub-periods. The first sub-period (1945–1965) really 
symbolized the rise and ripeness of the male breadwinner model. The second sub-period 
(1965–1975), characterized by a shift both in the politics of family and of women’s rights, led 
the way toward a modified male breadwinner model.  
  Although the French liberation movement gave women the right to vote in 1944 and 
the preamble to the Constitution marked a shift in the discourse of gender and democratic 
citizenship, no other notable change in family policy occurred. Since the beginning, French 
family policy had two mains objectives: to raise the birth rate and to compensate partially for 
the costs of families.  
  The law of December 31, 1945 put in place the “family quotient” system. This system 
had two main characteristics. First, joint taxation for married couples became compulsory. It 
benefited one-earner couples, especially since they had higher incomes. It also benefited those 
two-earner couples who had a great disparity between the husbands’ and wives’ earnings. 
Second, because of the family quotient’s child calculation,the tax reduction increased with 
income. The French family quotient favored higher-income families with (many) children 
because of the progressivity of the tax schedule, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
division by the number of parts often enabled earners to escape the highest tax bracket.  
  In 1945, the government awarded increased old age insurance benefits to pensioners 
having had or raised at least three children. This award was proportional to the amount of 
pension and was not liable to income tax.  
  The law of August 22, 1946, created pre- and post-natal allowances. The same law 
increased family allowances substantially. Unlike the family allowances system  in the 
interwar period, family allowances became  universal, and they attempted to  compensate 
families for dependent children irrespective of earnings or need. However, they were paid 
only to families with at least two children. The break with family policy of the 1930s and the 
1940s was not complete.  
  The law of August 22 1946 took up again the device of family benefits set up in 1941, 
by strongly revaluing the “single-salary allowance” (Allocation de salaire unique) for the   10 
second and the third child. Furthermore, this allowance became progressive depending on 
where in the birth order the child fell. The government initially granted the “single-salary 
allowance” to families with single wage-earners. It later created the “allowance for women at 
home raising children” (Allocation de mère au foyer), based on the same principle, for 
farmers’ families in 1955 and for self-employees’ families in 1956. One could interpret these 
allowances as a rough outline of maternal wage, aimed at discouraging mothers to enter the 
paid labor force, despite labor shortages during post-war reconstruction.  
  Until the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the “single-salary 
allowance” proved a major component of French family policy. It significantly augmented the 
resources of families with a single earner, especially the families with two or more children. 
For example, in 1947, the amount of the “single-salary allowance” for a family of two 
children doubled the family allowance, and the total of these two benefits equalled 90 percent 
of the average wage of a female worker. For a family of three children, the amounts of the 
“single-salary allowance” and the family allowances were identical, and their sum represented 
150 percent of the average wage of a female worker (Jacqueline Martin 1998: 1135). The 
“single-salary allowance” and the family allowances were not subject to income tax.  
  Between 1946 and 1954, the labor-force participation rate of working mothers with 
two dependant children fell from 23 to 17.5 percent, and, for working mothers with three 
children or more, their labor-force participation rate decreased from 12.5 to 9.8 percent. In 
contrast, for working mothers with one child, the rate remained practically unmodified (32 
percent in 1946 and 31 percent in 1954). The level at which the “single-salary allowance” was 
paid was high enough to incentivize mothers of at least two children to stay at home to raise 
their children or to withdraw from the labor market, especially since their wages were weak at 
this time and there was little investment in collective nurseries.  
  The interaction of the income tax system with the family benefits system worked both 
to keep women out of the labor force and to help male earners to support their dependents. In 
the post-World War II period, the male breadwinner model underlay both income tax system 
and family policy. Since the head of the tax household in French tax legislation was the 
husband until 1983, the family quotient stipulated the housewife as a dependent spouse, and 
the presence of housewife made the family eligible for the “single-salary allowance”. The 
system, thus,  incorporated a double “housewife bonus”. Both familialist and pronatalist 
concerns motivated these income tax and social provisions.  
  The Civil Law and Family Code also reflected the weight of traditional gender 
ideology. Married women lacked basic civil rights in the marriage according to the Code   11 
Napoléon adopted in 1804, which gave juridical power to husbands. The husband had the 
right to prevent his wife from working. Paternal authority extended to children and joint 
authority of the parents did not replace that provision of the law until 1970.  
  From 1965 onward, a series of reforms both in Civil Law and in family policy would 
modify the male breadwinner model. France gradually modernized the old family law, the 
Code Napoléon. The law of July 13, 1965, reformed the law on marriage. Married women 
gained control over their own property and legal affairs. They also gained new reproductive 
rights to contraception (the law ofDecember28, 1967). The law of June 4, 1970, put an end to 
“paternal power” and granted both parents shared parental authority. It abolished the reference 
to the head of household in the Civil Code. The law of January 17, 1975, made abortion 
legal;however, it was not reimbursed by medical insurance until 1982. Last, in the same year, 
the law of July 11, 1975, permitted divorce by mutual consent.  
  In the field of family policy, as the labor force participation rate of married women 
increased from 31.6 percent in 1968 to 40 percent  in 1975 and more couples began to 
cohabitate (Louis Roussel 1978), policymakers no longer tried to impose a family model. 
Instead, they tended to take into account these socio-economic changes. The issue of childcare 
appeared on the national agenda in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the state began to 
respond to the needs of dual-career couples. According to Pierre Laroque (1985), the 1970s 
served as the key years in the development of public childcare, even if the effort in this area 
remained insufficient to meet needs. Thus, between 1970 and 1979, the number of available 
places in collective day nurseries doubled, and that of family day nurseries almost increased 
tenfold
11
                                                 
11 In France, familial day nurseries (crèches familiales) are publicly financed and regulated. The childcare 
providers who care for three children at the most (including their own children) in their home are employed and 
supervised by regional or local authorities or by voluntary associations.  
. In 1972, the government created an allowance for covering some of the costs of 
non-parental childcare (allocation pour frais de garde). It was mean-tested and targeted at 
families with working mothers. They also increased the “single-salary allowance” and the 
“allowance for women at home rising children” with means testing to benefit the families 
with young children under three. In 1972, anincome-related measure (assurance vieillesse des 
mères de famille) aimed at enabling the recipients of the “single-salary allowance” or of the 
“allowance for women at home rising children” to be affiliated without charge to the old age 
insurance program. Childrearing became the equivalent of employment. The law of July 4, 
1975 abolished the condition of professional activity for granting family benefits. Family 
benefits became completely generalized. No longer were solely the worker and his family   12 
covered, but now the children of all families whatever they were, were covered. All these 
measures reflected the state commitment to policy-neutrality regarding a women’s role (to 
engage in paid work or to remain at home to raise their children).  
  By  the  early  1970s, a shift toward  the creation of targeted and means-tested 
benefitshad occurred (creation of an allowance for orphaned children in 1970, social housing 
benefits in 1971, new school-year allowance in 1974 and allowance for disabled children and 
adults in 1975). A concern for vertical redistribution became a priority, although the French 
Welfare systeminitially meant to compensate for familial charges (horizontal distribution) 
universally
12
  After the election of the new President Valéry  Giscard d'Estaing in 1974
.  
 
2.2 1975–2000: The French male-breadwinner’s decline 
  One may consider the mid-seventies as the beginning of a period of great 
transformations. The old model of the paternalist family started to erode, and the birth rate 
decreased. The economic crisis gave rise to a structural and growing mass unemployment. In 
the meantime, however, the paid-laborparticipation rates of women—and especially of 
married women—were constantly growing.  
  Traditional employment policy based on Keynesian principles could not stop the mass 
unemployment increase, resulting in the emergence and development of new policies during 
the eighties and the nineties. These policies stemmed from the development of new forms of 
employment—part-time and temporary employment. 
  French family policy was torn between neutrality toward women’s employment, on 
the one hand, and the compensation of child costs, on the other. During this period, family 
policy evolved and became a part of employment policies by incentivizing mothers of poor 
families to withdraw from the labor market to raise their child or children.  
  One can divide this timeframe into two sub-periods. In the first (1975–1983), steps 
had been taken toward  modernizing French family policy. The second one (1984–2000) 
related to a shift in the doctrine which underlined women’s employment policy.  
13
                                                 
12 There were already some targeted benefits granted using means testing (housing benefits in 1948, and a 
minimum old-age allowance and a minimum invalidity allowance in 1965) but it was not interpreted as a new 
orientation in family policy.  
13 He served as president from 1974 until 1981. In May 1981, the socialist François Mitterand became President 
of France.  
,the 
government implemented a set of measures to promote the labor participation of mothers. The 
law of July 12, 1977, abolished the “single-salary allowance”, the “allowance for women at   13 
home rising children”, and the allowance covering some of the costs of non-parental childcare 
that had been created in 1972; in turn, it introduced the “supplementary family allowance” 
(complément familial). This new benefit was means-tested and initially paid to families with 
at least one child under three years old or to extensive families (three dependent children or 
more). This new allowance targeted low-income and large families and was not related to 
women’s employment decisions. The abolition of the “single-salary allowance” and the 
“allowance for women at home rising children” marked the erosion of the model of 
housewife. 
  Moreover, day care services for children below the age of three developed rapidly in 
the seventies and early eighties. Between 1975 and 1980, the number of enrolment spaces in 
collective childcare facilities grew by 57,900 places, an increase of 67 percent. Another sign 
of modernism in the politics of childcare was the law dated May 17, 1977; this awarded 
official status tochildcare providers and determined the state’s licensure requirements. Thus, 
childcare became professionalized.  
  However, in a context of high unemployment and falling birth rate, policy biased 
against women’s employment did not completely disappear. The familialist foundations of the 
welfare state still underlay public policy. First, the family quotient remained a part of the 
family transfers system, and its role was strengthened in relation to population concerns. In 
1980,the government gave an additional half-part to families with at least five children. In 
1981,it granted an additional half-part to families with at least three children. Last, in 1987,it 
granted an additional half-part to large families for every child beyond the second-born. 
  Moreover, it implemented two new measures that had a direct negative impact on 
women’s employment decisions. First, it established the single parent allowance (Allocation 
de parent isolé, API), a minimum-income, means-tested benefit paid to the single parent until 
the child was 3  years old (long-term API) or during one year (short-term API). The 
implementation of this allowance decreased the employment rate of single mothers with one 
child. However, the government implemented this measure in a context of labor market 
deterioration. Single mothers with young children have been particularly affected by rising 
unemployment(de Curraize and Périvier 2010).  Second, an unpaid parental leave (congé 
parental d'éducation) was created in 1977; this could be taken up to the child’s third birthday. 
In this case, the employment contract was suspended and no wage was paid to the leave-
taker,yet the employer had to ensure the employee could return to employment under the 
same employment conditions as those of the job the person held earlier.    14 
  As in other developed countries, the question of work and family balance emerged in 
France with the decline of the male breadwinner model. This issue became of crucial 
importance in political discourses in the mid-eighties.  However, in the beginning of the 
second sub-period, despite of the election of a new president—the left-wing party leader 
François Mitterrand, the combination of the growth of the public deficit, mass unemployment, 
and atypical jobs induced harsh economic constraints and changes in public policies. These 
structural transformations had specific effects on family policy and the women’s labormarket-
participation incentives. 
  First, France progressively adopted a new family policy framework tending to develop 
alternative provisions of affordable full-time or part-time care services. To carry this out, the 
government created two new allowances: the home-based childcare allowance (Allocation de 
garde d'enfant à domicile, AGED) in 1986 and the allowance subsidizing the employment of a 
registered childcare provider  (Aide à la famille pour l'emploi d'une assistante maternelle 
agréée, AFEAMA) in 1990 (for more details see the  Appendix on Family and Childcare 
Benefits System in France). Two factors completed the framework of direct transfers—first, 
the presence of an income tax deduction compensating childcare expenses since 1976, and, 
second, the creation in 1992 of a new income tax cut for employing domestic help.  
  Moreover, the second sub-period demonstratesa downward shift in the creation of new 
places  in collective childcare arrangements. The AGED allowance and the AFEAMA 
allowance aimed at developing more privatised and flexible childcare services. Private 
childcare arrangements lowered the demand for publicly provided childcare and alleviated 
public expenses. Between 1991 and 2001, the number of AGED recipients increased 
considerably—from 12,000 to 61,000. The number of AFEAMA recipients reached 598,000 
in 2001, compared to 110,000 in 1991. Indeed, from the theoretical point of view adopted 
here, one may consider these evolutions as a transition from a dual earner/state caregiver 
model to a dual earner/marketized caregiver model. 
  Second, the government created a new allowance in 1985: the parental child-rearing 
allowance (allocationparentale  d'éducation, APE), granted to families with at least three 
children, one under the age of 3 (for more details see Appendix on the Family and Childcare 
Benefits  System  in France). The APE benefit appeared to be the first direct attempt to 
incentivize women to withdrawal from the labor market. 
  These evolutions prepared  the way  for a policy shift toward balancing  work and 
family. In the context of budget deficits, economic difficulties, and atypical jobs development, 
the family policy became part of the larger employment policy. The government came to   15 
prefer  individualized services over spending on such  publicly provided  and more costly 
services as childcares centers. In addition, their development enabled an enlarged role for the 
labor market, especially for childcare providers, and increased the range of childcare choices 
offered to parents. The idea of free choice has been the cornerstone of work and family 
balance discourse and policy since 1980s. It expressed women’s right to choose between care 
and work and about the type of childcare would best suit her family. 
  Two laws passed in this period played key roles in this overall shift: 
  1) The law of December 31, 1992, created financial incentives favoring part-time work 
because of the reduction in the employer’s social security contribution.  
  2)  The law of July 25, 1994,  led to different changes in family benefits.First,  it 
simplified the AGED allowance and AFEAMA allowance; second, the law introduced part-
rate AGED and APE; third, it extended the APE benefit to families with at least two children 
and reduced the previous employment conditions for applicants.  
  The immediate  and most visibleeffect  of this measure was a fall in the labor 
participation rate of mothers with two children with the youngest child aged fewer than 3 
years. Mothers who experienced frequent unemployment or held low paid, unskilled, and 
insecure jobs seized the opportunity to withdraw the labor market.
14
                                                 
14 98 percent of APE recipients were women.  
 In fact, between March 
1994 and March 1997, the labor participation rate of mothers with young children dropped 
from 69 percent to 53.5 percent, the level of the early 1980s. According to different estimates, 
it affectedbetween 100,000 and 250,000 mothers of two children (one aged under three years) 
who would have normally continued working after the birth of their second child if the reform 
was not been implemented (Cedric Afsa 1998, Thomas Piketty 2005).  
  These laws resulted in the creation of an incentive framework that favorednot only 
lower-educated and less-skilled mothersgiving up paid work but also the creation of part-time 
employment. In the beginning of the nineties, part-time employment represented 12 percent of 
the employed population; in contrast, by the end of the nineties,it represented more than 18 
percent. Women held the great majority of part-time positions: for example, in January 1999, 
82.6 percent of part-time employees were women. 
 
2.3 After the decline of French male breadwinner: A long period of transition? 
  A third distinct period has developed since the end of the nineties featuring several key 
characteristics:   16 
  1) From a macroeconomic point of view, both public deficit and public debt have 
increased. This, in turn, has strengthened the economic constraints on public policies. The rate 
of unemployment has remained significant in France, and, hence, part-time jobs, temporary 
and short-term  work contracts continued to hold appeal. These phenomena have directly 
affected the conditions of women’s participation in the labor market. However, the labor force 
participation rate of women has continuously risen during this third period. The number of 
childcare places in the collective childcare facilities increased by an average of 1.89 percent 
per year between 2000 and 2007, but the number of childcare places in traditional collective 
day-care centers declined favoring open centers, which combine childcare centers, family day 
care, drop-in childcare centers,  and kindergartens  in the same space.  Since 2000, the 
development of open centers has aimed at offering more choices to parents and meeting their 
needs in a context of increasing flexibility of work schedules.  
  2) The traditional male breadwinner model is no longer dominant. Instead, one can 
identify two distinct trends. 
  First, since the seventies, France has experienced a sharp increase in the number of 
single parents with children, representing 9.4 percent of families with children at home under 
the age of 25 in 1975 and 21.8 percent in 2008.  
  Second, both partners working full time has become the most common pattern among 
couples aged 20–49 wherein at least one partner has a job. The proportion in 2003 was 52 
percent, as compared with 45 percent on average in Eu-25 (Christel Aliaga 2005). However, 
the presence of dependent children influences the rates and patterns of women’s employment. 
In 2003, the figures for part-time work ranged from 21 percent—for women aged 20–49 with 
one child under 12, to 32 percent—for those with two children, and 45 percent—for those 
with three or more children.
15
  3) As in other European countries, the proportion of the older population has expanded 
in France since the mid-eighties, producing larger numbers of people in need of long-term 
care. The problem of care for the frail elderly reached the policy agenda by the mid-1980s, 
but the government did not enact a specific policy toward dependent elderly people until the 
mid-1990s, despite the existence of numerous expert reports and,between 1991 and 1993, five 
 Although the existence of children and their number and age 
represent important factors in the mother’s employment situation, the level of education and 
the type of employment also explain both the decision to participate in the labor market and 
the number of hours worked.  
                                                 
15  Data are based on the Eurostat Labor Force Survey (2003), using a harmonized measure of part-time work 
and defining part time asworking up to 30 hours a week.    17 
proposals for laws on dependent care and on the implementation of a dependence allowance 
for elderly people (Francis Kessler 1997). Policy development toward  dependent elderly 
people has been both slow and progressive in France.  
  The French social insurance system, due—in part—to its institutional organization 
(divided into social risks) and the impossibility of considering dependence as a social riskuntil 
the present, was not really suitable to support care for dependent elderly people. The 
government devoted day-care services and benefits to disabled people, and these were both 
insufficient and inappropriate for satisfying the growing needs of elderly dependent people. In 
other words, during the eighties and part of the nineties, most elderly care work was organized 
within families with little public support. The main allowance payable to dependent elderly 
people was, until 1997, the compensatory allowance for help (allocation compensatrice pour 
tierce personne), although it was initially conceived for those with disabilities.  
  The law of January 24, 1997, creating the Specific Dependency Allowance (Prestation 
Spécifique Dépendance, PSD), offered an allowance to dependent elderly persons as a support 
to cope with the dependence situation.
16
  Not only did the preoccupation of meeting the needs of dependent elderly people, but 
also the desire of French policymakers to find a way of creating new jobs in the services 
sectors, especially home-help services, motivated the implementation of the PSD system 
(Claude Martin 2001). In fact, PSD recipients could use the benefit to pay someone to help 
them in their everyday lives. The PSD system also permitted hiring relatives, except for the 
spouse or the cohabitant. For a long time, French authorities have refused to develop publicly 
financed services for the elderly while  the percentage of older people grew.  This  has 
explained the paradoxical features of the French model pointed out by Diane Sainsbury 
 However, the government  implemented  it  in a 
context of curbing public expenditure. Funded by the general councils, the PSD allowance 
financed the employment of people working in homes  or within institutions for heavily 
dependent people aged 60 and over. A joint health and social care team evaluated dependence 
levels and care needs. The level of the PSD allowance depended on the degree of dependency 
and the dependent person’s own resources andwas subject to a fixed ceiling. By the end of 
2000, only 15 percent of the frail elderly received the benefit (150,000 recipients). Moreover, 
the average amount of this allowance varied widely between different regions because each 
county could give more than the minimum defined by the law.  
                                                 
16 Before this law, the law of July 25, 1994 set up the principles of experiment and evaluation of a new elderly 
people care system. A dependence benefit was subject to an experimental pilot system developed by some 
counties (départements) in 1995–1996, before being applied widely.    18 
(1999b, 246): a  low provision  of services  and few supportive policies for  the dependent 
elderly contrast with the high provision of both services for children and policies to support 
working mothers.  
  The creation of a personal independence allowance (Allocation Personnalisée 
d'Autonomie, APA) by the law of July 20, 2001, formed the next step in long-term care policy 
development. This benefit, since in force, has three main characteristics. First, it serves people 
aged 60 and older at home or in institutions according to their level of dependency. Staff 
evaluates dependence using a single and specific scale, the AGGIR (Autonomie, 
Gérontologie, Groupes Iso-Ressources), which classifies the dependence situation in 6 levels 
(GIR 1 to GIR 6, decreasing the levels of dependence as one moves toward 6). Dependent 
elderly people up to level 4 in the AGGIR grid qualify for the APA allowance. Second, the 
benefit  system  is both national and local inasmuch as the legislation is national but the 
implementation is local. However, to guarantee access to the same services throughout the 
country, the government pays the APA benefit to finance a care package defined by social and 
health professionals, the package equates to the purchase of service supplied by a professional 
or a relative (except for the spouses). Third, the APA system  combines a principle of 
assistance with a co-payment system: the APA recipients contribute to the funding of their 
care packages according to their level of income, except for those whose incomes do not 
exceed a certain threshold (€689,50 per month in 2009). Furthermore, unlike the PSD benefit, 
the APA legislation does not make provision for recovery of the recipient’s inheritance.   
  Following  the development of eldercare policy in France,  we  must  mention the 
creation of a national fund to support care for dependent and disable people (Caisse Nationale 
de Solidarité pour l’Autonomie, CNSA) after the midsummer heat of 2003. Amounting to 15 
billion euros in 2008, a “national journey of solidarity” finances this system (the employers 
pay a contribution of 0.3 percent of the payroll in return for this worked but not paid day). 
Financing also includes a 0.1 percent of the Contribution Sociale Généralisée (CSG, a tax 
levied on all taxpayers in France and on every kind of income, which contributes to the 
funding of social security), plus 0.3 percent of the tax on capital or investment incomes, and 
the transfer of credits for frail elderly and disabled people from the social security fund. One 
can interpret this fund for the frail elderly as a step toward the insurance principle—despite 
the government’s constant postponement of a bill draft aimed at introducing dependency as 
the fifth risk in the French social welfare system.
17
                                                 
17The French social welfare system is mainly based on a specific set of organizations called the Social security 
(Sécurité sociale) which is divided into four branches, each covering one social risk: 1. health or sickness, 2. 
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  Major transformations and reforms in income taxation and family policy occurred in 
the 2000s. 
  In spring 2001, the Jospin government launched the French tax credit system, called 
“Prime Pour l’Emploi” (PPE). It is an example of an in-work benefit and attempts to raise net 
income for low-income working people.Hence, it contributes to reducing poverty while 
concurrently increasing employment incentives. The PPE amount depends on length of time 
worked and earnings, family status, number of children, and taxable household income; the 
means test is based on total household income despite the payment of the PPE directly to an 
individual.  It grants a  bonus to the  inactive spouse and children. However, compared to 
similar programs in the United Kingdom and the United States,  the PPE amount  paid  is 
smaller. The average annual amount of the PPE was 295 euros per household in 2005, as 
opposed to more than 2,500 euros per recipient household of the Working Family Tax Credit 
and almost 700 euros per recipient household of the Earned Income Tax Credit (Elena 
Stancanelli 2008: 2037). In 2003, the government put in place a mechanism to increase the 
PPE amount for part-time workers or for those working only part of the year.  
  Recently—and in name of “freedom of choice”, the state has introduced flexible and 
shorter leave to enable men and women to care for sick or disabled children or for dependent 
elderly relatives.  
  Recipients value the allowance for looking after sick or disabled children (“allocation 
journalière de présence parentale”), introduced in 2001 and reformed in 2006. Indeed,rather 
than lack of equipment ora need for specialized employees,the main reason parents use this 
systemis theywant to care personally for their children, (Julien Damon and Nadia Kesterman 
2004). However, in 95 percent of cases, the leave-takers are women. Only in 1 percent of 
cases do both parents reduce their working time to care for their sick or disabled children. For 
care of an elderly relative, family caregivers have been entitled,since 2006, to three months’ 
unpaid leave (“congé de soutien familial”) that may be extended up  to one year. The 
insurance system for non-working parents pays the family caregivers’ contributions to the 
pension system. One can interpretall of these measures as the means of compensating care 
giving in a context of reactivation of family solidarities. The compensations take the forms of 
cash or entitlement to social rights.  
  In order to encourage fathers to increase involvement with their children,in 2002,the 
government added an additional  eleven days’ paternity leave (eighteen days in case of 
                                                                                                                                                         
industrial injury and occupational diseases, 3. old age, and 4.  family. In addition, an unemployment insurance 
system exists.    20 
multiple births) to the existing three days’ statutory leave.
18
  The launch of the CESU (Chèque emploi service universel) systemalso invoked the 
principle of “free choice” for the “Family Conference” of September 2005.
 This paternity leave has been 
relatively successful: almost two-thirds of potential recipients use this leave. However, time-
budget surveys show that the change in the division of domestic labor has occurred slowly 
although women are performing more  paid work  than before. They continue to spend 
considerably more time doing unpaid domestic work than men (Sophie Ponthieux and 
Amandine Schreiber 2006).  
  In 2004, France undertook a major reform of the childcare program. It merged several 
child and childcare allowances into a sole benefit, the early childhood benefit (Prestation 
d’Accueil du Jeune Enfant, PAJE; for more details, see Appendix on family and childcare 
benefits scheme in France).Several principles underscored this new benefit,  created to 
simplify the childcare benefits system.First, parents had a free choice of childcare facilities; 
secondly, parents also had the free choice to continue to work, to reduce working hours, or to 
stop working to care for their young child. 
19 In fact, France 
presented the CESU system as a means of reconciling professional and family life, however, 
it  related mainly to  job creation concerns. The CESU attempts  to simplify personal and 
household services (domestic and caregiving services, tutoring, computer help, and so forth),  
to reduce undeclared work, and to support the employment of low-skilled persons in this 
sector. The CESU takes two forms.First, a bank voucher can be used by individual employers 
to pay their employees with a simplified procedure for hiring, paying, and making social 
security contributions. They also benefit from an income-tax reduction or a tax credit for 
personal and household services expenditures.
20 Second, the prepaid voucher allows 
companies, public administrations, or social welfare organizations to subsidize paid domestic 
and caregiver services for their employees. Companies can claim a tax reduction of 25 percent 
on this expenditure. Although the CESU systemdoes not represent an innovative measure 
since the French government has developed this since the beginning of the 1990s,it does 
comprise various systems to subsidize and to support domestic and caring services both inside 
and outside the home
21
                                                 
18The three days’ statutory leave are fully paid, remaining days flat rate. 
19 Cf. www.archives.premier-
ministre.gouv.fr/villepin/information/fiches_52/conference_famille_2005_cheque_53989.html 
20A credit tax introduced in 2007 was only granted to thosetaxpayers who were economically active or registered 
as job seekers at the job center. 
21 The CES (Chèque Emploi Service) and TES (Titre Emploi Service) systems are the forerunners of the CESU 
system.  
, it formed the cornerstone of the “Borloo plan” in 2005. This plan   21 
targeted  stimulating the sector of personal and household services by focusing on the 
organization of supply and the development of companies providing such services. France 
recently launched a new plan for developing personal and household services in March 2009. 
The French government continues to believe that there is a huge potential for job creation in 
the domestic and caring services sector.  
  All these changes hold a rather important and innovative position regarding French 
social and tax laws. Nonetheless,  the basis of family transfers remains unchanged. In 
particular, the family quotient still plays an important  role  in  determining  income tax. 
Moreover, two of the guidelines that appear the second period dominate these changes: the 
use of family policy as part of employment policies, on the one hand, and the development of 
new child and eldercare provisions based on the rhetoric of free choice on the other hand. 
However, one must emphasize the innovations in the articulation of income tax and family 
benefits. During the first period, the family quotient served as the tax-side basis of the family 
transfers framework that incentivized women to withdraw from the labor market. During the 
second period, the government introduced some changes in the income tax, but without any 
straight link to family policy measures put in place to modify women'sdecisions to participate 
in the labor force. During the third period, a new pattern of income tax cuts and family 
benefits emerged. The use of new income tax cuts has tended to become more systematic 
when state authorities are willing to introduce new changes in the family benefits framework. 
In particular, new income tax cuts systematically complement such new allowances as the 
PAJE or new direct incentives as the CESU, reinforcing their impact. 
  Considering Rosemary Crompton’s continuum of gender arrangements, the changes 
the  French  have made in  the  direct and indirect family transfers framework since the 
beginning of the third period have strengthened two trends. First, these changes created strong 
new incentives favoring women’s part-time employment. For example, if the PPE tax credit 
discourages married women’s labor-market participation because of the means-testing on total 
household resources (Elena Stancanelli 2008), the PAJE-CLCA incentivizes women in the 
seventh to tenth income deciles to reduce their working hours and to work between 50 to 80 
percent of normal working hours. The PAJE-CLCA amount is higher than the amount of the 
previous benefit, APE, when women do not cease working but opt for a reduction in working 
time (François Marical 2007a). Second, the combination of the reform of benefits for young 
children in 2004, the creation of the APA allowance for dependent elderly people, the 
implementation of the CESU system, and tax reductions offered to companies and households 
when they use CESU vouchers explains the development of the domestic and caring services   22 
sector. In 1997, the workers in this sector numbered 725,000—in 2005, 1.4 million. The 
CESU comprises the main means of payment for domestic and caring services (Alexandra 
Chol 2007).  
  These two trends favor the earner/career gender arrangements that have emerged since 
the nineties. As Rosemary Crompton (1999: 204) pointed out, “variations in the earner/career 
gender arrangements may be linked with systematic variations in both gender equality, as well 
as in more general material inequalities.” From this point of view, the French new gender 
arrangement produces new inequalities between males and females in both paid and unpaid 
work. First, the percentage of female domestic workers (including young childcare services) 
amounted to  87.7 percent in 2005. Moreover, jobs in this sectorare  often part-time and 
underpaid. More than 50 percent of domestic workers (except young childcare services) have 
two or more jobs (Alexandra Chol 2007). Second, as to the unpaid work, like other European 
countries (Agneta Stark 2005), care for the elderly remains deeply gendered in France. For 
example, women represent 64 percent of care providers in the caseswith only one caregiver 
(Ségolène Petite and Amandine Weber 2006). Last, in France, gender roles are shifting 
slowly, despite the creation of paid paternity leave and more fathers’ investment in childcare 
activities in dual-participant households (Denise Bauer and Sophie Penet 2005). National 
time-use surveys carried out between 1998 and 2004 indicate that women spent more time on 
unpaid domestic work, especially on childcare tasks.
22
  On the contrary, the introduction of the PAJE—combined with the collective labor 
agreement—seems to have induced childcare providers’  wage increase (François Marical 
2007b). Last, the French situation remains transitional between the state caregiver and the 
marketized caregiver models. Nonetheless,the reinforcement of the marketized model—to the 
detriment of the state caregiver—incentivizes women to work part time. Although the most 
common employment pattern is both partners working fulltime, the proportion of one-and-a-
 
  Regarding Rosemary Crompton’s continuum of gender arrangements, the French 
situation remains transitional, falling between the state caregiver and the marketized caregiver 
models, even with the latter highly subsidized by the State. In France, French family policies 
provide parents with support for childcare. In the name of maintaining “free choice” between 
working or caring, both options have State  support. Whatever mothers’ choice, they are 
entitled to state support, either by being offered childcare facilities or paid care allowances 
and parental leave or by tax cuts for childcare expenses to reduce childcare costs for families.  
                                                 
22Eurostat, The life of women and men in Europe, 2008 edition. French women, aged 25–44, spend on average 
some 268 minutes a day on unpaid domestic work as opposed to 123 minutes in the case of men.   23 
half-earner couples in families with a child under six has increased (11.9 percent in 1984 




  Using Rosemary Crompton’s continuum of gender arrangements as a heuristic device, 
we have outlined the trends in gender relations in France and how the French welfare state has 
moved from the traditional model (Male breadwinner/female caregiver) to the third stage of 
the continuum (Dual earner/state caregiver or Dual earner/marketized caregiver). Various 
institutions and policies shape these different models, which rest on assumptions about the 
gendered divisions of care and market work. The dynamics of family policy remain highly 
path-dependent. Familism continues  to dominate in France, albeit in a modified version. 
Moreover, the government largely directs family policies toward  labor market objectives 
rather than  toward gender egaliarianism or other less market-oriented concerns. 
  A  rhetoric of “choice”  on the reconciliation of work and family underpins many 
national social policy initiatives, in particular the cash-for-care systems, which have been 
increasingly introduced in many countries. In France, the last major reform in childcare policy 
occurred in 2004. The PAJE benefit replaced various systems and child benefits. France has 
declared its objective to be the promotion of parents’ freedom of “choice” in order to reduce 
work-life conflict. This includes both women’s “choice” to work or to withdraw from the 
labor market to care for their children and their “choice” of childcare facilities. This reform 
reinforces a growing tendency begun in the 1980s and 1990s to develop more individualized 
solutions to childcare. However, relative to past trends, note that the novelty of this childcare 
benefit system lies in its inclusion of measures to encourage mothers on leave to work part-
time, to reduce their working hours, and to facilitate their return in employment. The 
combination of a discourse of parental “choice” and  an assumption that parental leaves 
facilitate women’s choices reflect the traditional gender divisions implicit in French family 
policy.  The emphasis on freedom of “choice”  helps  redefine the boundaries between the 
public and private sphere, on the one hand, and between state and market, on the other hand. 
Indeed, one should connect the politics of choice to the development of direct cash payments 
for care. Cash-for-care proves an important element in the privatization and marketization of 
welfare states. In addition, the idea of “choice” explands the connections between full-time 
and part-time employment and child-rearing options. However, “choices”  are socially 
embedded. “Preferences” or “choices” to be more involved in care and less in paid work   24 
remain  dependent on such  factors as level of education, conditions of employment, and 
cultural definitions of motherhood and fatherhood.Class divisions among households continue 
to determine labor market outcomes for mothers in France. In fact, the more well-off women 
can outsource domestic tasks while less well-off women cannot, or cannot to the same extent. 
Furthermore, women performalmost all this work—in positions in personal and household 
services that can often be precarious and underpaid. Work of this nature tends to increase 
inequality between low-income women and higher-income women. Policymakers should act 
to enhance the possibility for parents to make real or genuine choices by taking into account 
the interdependence of choices made by mothers and fathers and the implications for mothers’ 
material welfare. Last, as argues Amartya Sen (1999)—and ultimately important —people 
should have substantive opportunities (« capabilities ») to lead the kinds of lives they have 
reason to value.  
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Appendix  
 
Table 1: Public spending on family benefits in cash, services and tax measures (in percentage 
of GDP), 2007 
 
  Cash  Services  Tax breaks 
towards family 
Total 
France  1,33  1,66  0,72  3,71 
Denmark  1,48  1,80  0,00  3,28 
Sweden  1,49  1,86  0,00  3,35 
Germany  1,09  0,75  0,88  2,71 
Italy  0,65  0,75  0,00  1,40 
Spain  0,52  0,71  0,24  1,47 
United Kingdom  2,13  1,11  0,33  3,58 
OECD 33-average  1,22  0,78  0,25  2,20 
Note: Public spending on family benefits includes financial support that is exclusively for families and children. 
Spending recorded in other social policy areas such as health and housing also assist families, but not 
exclusively, an dit is not included here.  
Cash transfers include child allowances, income support payments during periods of parental leave, income 
support for sole parent families, and public childcare support through earmarked payments to parents.  
Public spending on services for families with children includes direct financing and subsidising of providers of 
childcare and earlyeducation facilities, public spending on assistance for young people and residential facilities, 
public spending on family services, including centre-based facilities, and home help services for families in 
need.  
Tax expenditures towards families include tax exemptions, child tax allowances, child tax credits, amounts that 
are deducted frm the tax liability. Tax advantages for married people, as existent in for example Belgium, 
France, Germany are not included here.  
Source: OECD Family Database (2010) 
 
Table 2: Trends in employment patterns for couple parents families with a child under 6 
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Table 3 : Percentage of French children under 3 years in childcare according to the main care arrangement, from 
Monday to Friday and from 8 am to 19 pm, and when both parents are in full-time 
 
Childcare centers (crèches)   18 
Childminder registered  37 
Parents (one parent caring)  27 
Family members  9 
Subsidized nannies (at home)  4 
Other types of care  5 
Source : CNAF (2009) 
 
 
Table 4 : Enrolment rates of children under age 6 in formal care or early education services, 2008 
 
  0 – 2 years   3 – 5 years 
France  42,0  99,9 
Belgium  48,4  99,4 
Spain  37,5  98,5 
Italy  29,2  97,4 
Germany  17,8  92,7 
United Kingdom  40,8  92,7 
Denmark  65,7  91,5 
Sweden  46,7  91,1 
Netherlands  55,9  67,1 
United States  31,4  55,7 
Source: OECD Family Database (2010) 
 
Family and Childcare benefits scheme in France 
France has a package of measures that help parents with the costs of rearing children. Three 
types of benefit can be distinguished: 
1)  Income maintenance benefits  such as family allowances (allocations familiales) and 
supplementary family allowance (complément familial).  
Family allowances are granted without means test for second and subsequent children under 
the age of twenty. The amount varies according to the number, order of birth and age of the 
children.  
Supplementary family allowance (complément familial) is means-tested and paid to families 
raising at least three children if they are aged 3 years old and above.  
2) Targeted benefits such as new-school year allowance (allocation de rentrée scolaire, 
ARS), single parent allowance (allocation de parent isolé, API), family support allowance 
(soutien familial), allowance for disabled children (allocation d’éducation de l’enfant 
handicapé), and adoption allowance (allocation d’adoption, AA).  
New-school year allowance (ARS) is income-related and paid once a year to compensate for 
the expenses incurred at the start of a new school year for children from 6 to 18 years old.  
Single parent allowance (API) is a means-tested allowance and paid to individuals who raise 
on their own at least one child. It is also avalaible to a single woman who are pregnant. The 
single parent allowance is a time-limited programme. If the child is older than 3 years, the 
benefit is paid for one year (short-term API). If the child is under 3 years old, the API is 
granted until the child’s third birthday (long-term birthday). The long-term API pertains to 
about 80 percent of the cases. The single parent allowance was abolished when the Active 
Solidarity Income (Revenu de Solidarité Active, RSA) came into force on June 1, 2009. The 
RSA has replaced the minimum integration income (RMI created in december 1988), the   30 
single parent allowance and also certain temporary fixed-rate aids such as « the return to work 
bonus ». The active solidarity income is an allocation which completes the initial household 
resources to reach the level of a guaranteed income.  The guaranteed inco me is calculated as 
the sum:  1) of   a lump sum, the amount of which varies according to the household 
composition and the number of childs ; 2) of a fraction of the professional income of 
household members fixed by decree to 62 percent.   If the initial resources of the hosehold 
are lower than the lump sum, the difference is called the RSA base. The possible supplement 
income of activity, equal to 62 percent of the income of activity, is called the RSA activity. 
According to the level of household resources with regard to the lump sum and the presence 
or not of activity income, a household can perceive a single constituent of the RSA or 
both.  For those without work, the amount of the RSA is equivalent to the previous amount of 
the RMI or API. For those in work:    - during the first three months of employment, the 
beneficiary receives his or her salary in full along with the RSA allowance (if previously 
without work and in receipt of the RSA);  - for the following months, with no time limit, the 
beneficiary receives 62 percent of his or her salary along with the RSA allowance. 
Family support allowance is means-tested and paid to single parent or family taking on the 
responsibility for raising an orphaned child. This allowance is also paid in case of separation 
if it is proved that no alimony is received from the other parent.  
Allowance for disabled children  aims at compensating for the costs of bringing up a 
disabled child. The amount depends on the child’s incapacity rate, the reduction or 
interruption of one parent working hours, and the necessity of hiring someone to look after the 
disabled child.  
Adoption allowance is paid to families for every child adopted during twenty one months 
from the month following the arrival of the adopted child in the family.  
 
3) Benefits linked to birth and chilcare (child under 6 years old).  
Up until end-2003, there were several allowances: allowance for young children (allocation 
pour jeune enfant, APJE), parental child-rearing allowance (allocation parentale d’éducation, 
APE), allowance subsidizing the employment of a registered childminder (Aide à la famille 
pour l’emploi d’une assistante maternelle agréée, AFEAMA), home-based childcare 
allowance (allocation de garde d’enfant à domicile, AGED).  
Allowance for young children(APJE), which has been means-tested since September 1995, 
is paid during pregnancyand until the child’s third birthday. A family can receive only one 
APJE allowance even though there may be several children aged under 3 years old. 
Parental child-rearing allowance (APE) is granted to families with at least two children 
(one aged under 3 years old) on condition that the parent ceases completely or partially from 
paid work. The allowance amount is close to half the guaranteed minimum wage (SMIC in 
France) and paid until the child reaches the age of 3. A reduced amount can be paid if the 
person is working part-time. Entitlement is dependent upon the parent having worked for at 
least two years during the ten years preceding the birth of a third child or subsequent children 
or during the five years preceding the birth of the second child. Eligibility conditions are thus 
more restrictive for parents with only two children compared to parents with three or more.  
Allowance subsidizing the employment of a registered childminder(AFEAMA) is granted 
to families hiring a registered childminder to care for at least one child under 6 years old at 
the childminder’s home. It is required no professional activity condition from the parents. 
This childcare allowance covers the social security contributions to be paid by the employer 
of a registered childminder. An additional and income-related amount is also given and varies 
according to the child’s age.    31 
Home-based childcare allowance (AGED) partly covers the social security contributions to 
be paid by families who employ someone to care for at least one child under 6 years old at 
their home. Whatever their income, if both parents (and a single parent) are working, they are 
eligible for this home-based childcare allowance.  
In 2004, a major reform took place and five allowances (allowance for young children, APJE; 
parental child-rearing allowance, APE; allowance subsidizing the employment of a registered 
childminder, AFEAMA; home-based childcare allowance, AGED; and adoption allowance, 
AA) were merged into a sole benefit, the early childhood benefit (Prestation d’accueil du 
jeune enfant, PAJE). The PAJE benefit includes a childbirth allowance, a basic allowance, an 
additional parental care allowance (PAJE-CLCA) and an additional childcare allowance 
(PAJE-CMG). The PAJE benefit is awarded to children born since January 1, 2004.  
The childbirth allowance and the basic allowance are means-tested but around 90 percent of 
families are eligible. The childbirth allowance is fixed and amounts to 903,07 €. The basic 
allowance is paid 180,62 € per month until the child is 3 years old. These allowances replace 
the APJE allowance.  
The additional parental care allowance (PAJE-CLCA) is not means-tested. It is paid to 
families in which either parent (or both) stop working either completely or partially to care for 
a child under 3. It is available until child’s third birthday, except in the case of families with 
one child for whom the allowance is paid during six months. Eligibility conditions vary 
according to the number of child but they are more stringent for families with one child. This 
allowance replaces the APE allowance and the amount depends on many conditions: the 
family is or is not eligible to the basic allowance, the parent is wage-earner or self-employed, 
she/he has withdrawn from labor market, she/he taking leave works on part-time basis or 
reduces her/his working hours. In any case, the additional parental care allowance is a flat rate 
benefit payment and varies from 141,62 € to 560,40 € per month. A new parental leave 
scheme has been implemented since July 1, 2006 and it is named “complément optionnel de 
libre choix d’activité (COLCA)”. However, it is granted to parents with at least three children 
on condition that the parent gives up totally employment that has lasted at least two years in 
last five years preceding the birth or the adoption. The COLCA allowance is payable for one 
year and amounts to 620,78 € per month for parents eligible to the basic allowance and 801,39 
€ for those who are not.  
The additional childcare allowance (PAJE-CMG) covers the social security contribution costs 
due for the employment of a registered childminder or a nanny at home to care for children 
aged under six on condition that one parent or both parents are in employment. All of the 
social contributions to be paid by the employer of a registered childminder are covered and 
only 50 percent in case of the employment of a domestic employee. The PAJE-CMG 
allowance includes a financial supplement which is income-related and depends on the age of 
each child. Its amount varies from 84,79 € to 448,25 € per month.  
Apart from the above allowances, tax cut before 2007 and tax credit since 2007 amounting to 
50 percent of childcare expenditures are granted to households with children under 7 (an 
upper limit applies).  
Since January 1, 2001, an allowance for looking after sick or disabled children has been put in 
place. It was reformed in May 2006. The entitlement is open for a period of six months 
renewable within three years. The amount is 41,79 € per day for a couple and 49,65 for a 
single parent.  
The amounts given above are valid from January 1 to January 31, 2011.  
 